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INTRODUCTION

In Pertuis v. Front Roe Restaurants, Inc.,' the South Carolina Supreme
Court declined to ignore the corporate form of a party and "amalgamate"
three sibling corporations solely on the basis of a blurring of corporate
identities. 2 Instead, the court adopted a new two-part test for determining
when to disregard the corporate form and impose liability on corporations so
connected as to render them a single business enterprise.3 The court held that
the single-business enterprise theory (formerly known as amalgamation)
requires not only an intertwining of operations among corporations but also
evidence of fraud or fundamental unfairness as a result of the corporations'
connectedness. 4 This new test strengthens corporate protections by
submitting single-business enterprise theory to the bedrock principle that
courts can only ignore the corporate form if there is a substantial showing of
injustice or fundamental unfairness.'
Thus, Pertuis modified existing standards derived from South Carolina
case law permitting horizontal veil-piercing among corporations where there
was merely blurring of corporate activities. 6
Part II of this Comment discusses the state of the law in South Carolina
governing corporation formation, including the rise of limited liability and
methods of imposing extra-corporate liability as identified by South Carolina
courts. Part III addresses the facts, procedural history, and holding of
Pertuis. Part IV analyzes the court's adoption of the single-business
enterprise theory. Part V discusses recent South Carolina cases applying the
new rule for establishing single-business enterprise liability and other
broader potential impacts the Pertuis decision may have on corporate
liability. Part VI concludes by highlighting the strong equitable footing of
the new test for establishing single-business enterprise theory while
acknowledging the likely expansion of the doctrine in South Carolina courts.

1.
423 S.C. 640, 817 S.E.2d 273 (2018).
2.
See id. at 655, 817 S.E.2d at 280-81.
3.
Id. at 655, 817 S.E.2d at 280.
4.
Id. at 655, 817 S.E.2d at 281.
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 340, 384 S.E.2d
730, 734 (1989); Magnolia N. Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Heritage Cmtys., Inc., 397 S.C. 348,
359-60, 725 S.E.2d 112, 118 (Ct. App. 2012); Kincaid v. Landing Dev. Corp., 289 S.C. 89,
96, 344 S.E.2d 869, 874 (Ct. App. 1986).
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STATE OF CORPORATE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA

The concept of limited liability is among the most heralded innovations
of the twentieth century. Regarded as "the basis of the prosperity of the West
and the best hope for the future of the rest of the world,"' limited liability
embodies an American ideal claimed with equal fervor as "typically
reserved for motherhood, apple pie, and 4th of July celebrations."' The
introduction of the limited liability concept decreased many barriers to the
formation and prosperity of new enterprise. 9 Chief among the barriers
eliminated was cost.'o By reducing the overall cost of investment in new
enterprise, demand for investment opportunity rose. " Thus, as more capital
investment flooded into emerging enterprises, the multiplication and
diversification of investors shook monopolistic foundations that had
previously ruled American industry.12
The South Carolina Business Corporation Act 3 confers on corporations
the identity and rights of a separate jural person.1 4 One of those rights
includes the right to "sue and be sued, complain, and defend in its corporate
name."" Provided the articles of incorporation denote nothing to the
contrary,' 6 a shareholder of a corporation enjoys immunity from liability
stemming from corporate acts or debts but for specific acts or conduct of the
shareholder.' 7 Despite this statutory protection, the common law doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil to allow for the imposition of shareholder liability
"is the most litigated issue in corporate law."' 8

7.
JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE,
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA xv (2003).

THE COMPANY:

A SHORT

8.
Thomas E. Rutledge, Limited Liability (or Not): Reflections on the Holy Grail, 51
S.D. L. REv. 417, 420 (2006).
9.
See Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation:Limited Liability,
Democracy, andEconomics, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 148, 155-56 (1992).
10. Id. at 156 (quoting RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS
CORPORATION, 1784-1855, 186 (1982)).
11. Id. (quoting SEAVOY, supra note 10, at 256).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-1-101 to 20-105 (2006 & Supp. 2018).
Id. § 33-3-102 (2006).
Id. § 33-3-102(1).
Id. § 33-2-102, cmt. 3(e).
Id. § 33-6-220(b).

18. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate
Shareholdersas Mere Investors, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379, 383 (1999).
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South Carolina has long recognized that equity permits the disregard of
shareholder protection' 9 where "recognition of the corporate form would
extend the principle of incorporation 'beyond its legitimate purposes and
(would) produce injustices or inequitable consequences."'20 However, South
Carolina courts have routinely held that the court's power to impose liability
is only to be exercised "reluctantly" 2' and "cautiously." 22 Nevertheless, prior
to the court's decision in Pertuis, there existed three doctrines for
disregarding the corporate form with substantially varied standards in
application, particularly in regard to equitable justification.23
A.

Piercingthe Corporate Veil

While the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first
delineated a test for piercing the corporate veil in De Witt Truck Brokers, Inc.
v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co.,24 modem South Carolina jurisprudence
recognizing the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil primarily derives
from the South Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in Sturkie v. Sifly. 25
Subsequently, the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized the Sturkie
decision as foundational doctrine regarding piercing the corporate veil in
Multimedia Publishing of S.C., Inc. v. Mullins. 26 To set aside the corporate
form on the basis of the traditional vertical piercing doctrine, two elements
must be satisfied.27
First, the party seeking to disregard the corporate form has the burden of
proving a substantial number of the eight factors delineated in Sturkie in

19. See Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co., 380 S.C. 97, 101, 668 S.E.2d 798, 800
(2008); Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 456, 313 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ct. App. 1984).
20. DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flemming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 683 (4th
Cir. 1976) (quoting Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat'1 Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098,
1106 (5th Cir. 1973)).
21. Id. (quoting Pardo v. Wilson Line of Wash., Inc., 414 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir.
1969)).
22. Id. (quoting Country Maid, Inc. v. Haseotes, 299 F. Supp. 633, 637 (E.D. Pa.
1969)).
23. See generally Phillips L. McWilliams, Note, Magnolia North v. Heritage
Communities: The South Carolina Court of Appeals' End Run Around the Necessity of
Equitable Justification When Disregardingthe CorporateForm, 64 S.C. L. REV. 825, 831-33
(2013).
24. DeWitt, 540 F.2dat 685.
25. See generally Sturkie v. Sifly, 280 S.C. 453, 313 S.E.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1984).
26. 314 S.C. 551, 431 S.E.2d 569 (1993); see Shawn M. Flanagan, Piercing the
Corporate Veil in South Carolina, S.C. LAW., Nov. 2006, at 35, 36.
27. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457-58, 313 S.E.2d at 318.
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order to then move to the second factor of the test. 28 Those eight factors

include gross undercapitalization, lack of corporate formalities, non-payment
of dividends, insolvency of debtor corporation, siphoning of funds by
dominant shareholders, non-functioning officers or directors, lack of
corporate records, and the use of the corporation as a fayade for operation of
a dominant shareholder. 29
However, the court of appeals has clarified that subsequent to Sturkie,
both "[t]he ability under state corporate law to adopt and operate under a
statutory close corporation status" and the ability of a corporation to adopt
S-corporation status under federal law have diminished the importance of
some of the Sturkie factors, specifically the failure to observe corporate
formalities, nonfunctioning of other officers or other directors, the absence
of corporate records, and the nonpayment of dividends, as those factors are
expressly permitted by statute.3 0
The modification of the Sturkie factors related to close corporations'
formalities and liability was later codified in the South Carolina Close
Corporation Supplement.3' Specifically, the corresponding Official
Comment provides that:
[t]his section does not prevent a court from 'piercing the corporate
veil' of a statutory close corporation if the circumstances should
justify imposing personal liability on the shareholders were the
corporation not a statutory close corporation. It merely prevents a
court from 'piercing the corporate veil' because it is a statutory
close corporation.3 2
Second, when a party seeks to set aside the corporate form there must be
"an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness if the acts of the
corporation be not regarded as the acts of the individuals." 33 In evaluating
injustice or fundamental unfairness, the burden remains on the party seeking
to set aside the corporate form to prove "(1) that the defendant was aware of
the plaintiff s claim against the corporation, and (2) thereafter, the defendant
acted in a self-serving manner with regard to the property of the corporation

28. Id. at 457.
29. DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 685-87.
30. Hunting v. Elders, 359 S.C. 217, 225, 597 S.E.2d 803, 807 (Ct. App. 2004).
31. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-250 (2006).
32. Id. § 33-18-250 cmt.
33. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 457-58, 313 S.E.2d at 318; see also Dewitt, 540 F.2d at 685;
Hartfieldv. Getaway Lounge & Grill, Inc., 388 S.C. 407, 420, 697 S.E.2d 558, 564 (2010).
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and in disregard of the plaintiffs claim in the property." 3 4 South Carolina
courts have recognized that a defendant is sufficiently aware of a claim if
"he has notice of facts which, if pursued with due diligence, would lead to
knowledge of the claim." 35
However, the South Carolina Supreme Court has arguably liberalized
the test for establishing fundamental unfairness by suggesting, "[t]he essence
of the fairness test is simply that an individual businessman cannot be
allowed to hide from the normal consequences of carefree entrepreneuring
by doing so through a corporate shell." 3 6
B. Alter Ego
The South Carolina Supreme Court identified a related second doctrine
for setting aside corporate form, known as alter ego or instrumentality
theory, as "merely a means of piercing the corporate veil."3 7 Alter ego
requires "total domination of the subservient corporation to the extent the
subservient corporation manifested no separate corporate interests of its own
and functioned solely to achieve the purpose of the dominant corporation." 3 8
Additional factors to consider include "stock ownership by parent; common
officers and directors; financing of subsidiary by parent; payment of salaries
and other expenses of subsidiary by parent; failure of subsidiary to maintain
formalities of separate corporate existence; identity of logo; and plaintiffs
knowledge of subsidiary's separate corporate existence." 39
However, even in the presence of sufficient factors indicating control,
the absence of fraud or lack of evidence suggesting misuse of corporate

34. Sturkie, 280 S.C. at 459, 313 S.E.2d at 319 (citing 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 6
(Supp. 1982)); see also Hartfield v. Getaway Lounge & Grill, Inc., 388 S.C. 407, 420, 697
S.E.2d 558, 564 (2010) (citing Sturkie).
35. Hunting, 359 S.C. at 229, 597 S.E.2d at 809 (quoting Multimedia Publ'g of S.C.,
Inc. v. Mullins, 314 S.C. 551, 554, 431 S.E.2d 569, 572 (1993)).
36. Hartfield, 388 S.C. at 420, 697 S.E.2d at 564 (quoting Multimedia Publ'g of S.C.,
314 S.C. at 556, 431 S.E.2d at 573).
37. Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co., 380 S.C. 97, 101 n.1, 668 S.E.2d 798, 800 n.1
(2008) (quoting 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 23 (2008) (citation omitted)); see also Jones ex rel.
Jones v. Enter. Leasing Co.-Se., 383 S.C. 259, 267, 678 S.E.2d 819, 823 (Ct. App. 2009)
(quoting Drury Dev. Corp.).
38. Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Myrtle Beach Golf & Yacht Club, 310 S.C. 132,
148, 425 S.E.2d 764, 774 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat'l Distillers
& Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106 (5th Cir. 1973)).
39. Jones, 383 S.C. at 268, 679 S.E.2d at 824 (citing 16 AM. JUR. 2D Proofof Facts
§ 679 (2006)).
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control is fatal. 40 Without substantial equitable justification, a claim of alter
ego liability must fail regardless of the evidence suggesting control. 4 1
Although alter ego theory is generally used in parent-subsidiary corporate
contexts, 42 the court in Mid-South Management Company Inc. v. Sherwood
Development Corp.43 held that alter ego may apply in corporate contexts and
is not exclusively confined to situations regarding attorney-client agency,
employment, and lender liability. 44
C. Pre-PertuisAmalgamation
The doctrine of amalgamation as a means of setting aside the corporate
form was first recognized briefly in 1986 by the South Carolina Court of
Appeals in Kincaid v. Landing Development Corp.45 In Kincaid, the court
upheld a trial court decision to deny directed verdict where there was "an
amalgamation of corporate interests, entities, and activities so as to blur the
legal distinction between the corporations and their activities." 46 Decisions
involving claims of amalgamation as a theory for imposing extra-corporate
liability pre-Pertuis were upheld solely on such bases as shared locations,
phone numbers, board members, and corporate letterhead. 47 Furthermore,
the requirement for any showing of fraud or fundamental unfairness in a
claim of amalgamation remained entirely unaddressed until the South

40. See id. at 267-68, 679 S.E.2d at 824; see also Oskin v. Johnson, 400 S.C. 390, 40002, 735 S.E.2d 459, 465-66 (2012) (declining to impose alter ego liability where defendant
and his wife set up a limited liability corporation in order to secure defendant's claim to real
property because plaintiffs failed to show defendants' actions constituted fraud, injustice, or
violation of public policy).
41. Colleton Cty. Taxpayers Ass'n v. Sch. Dist. of Colleton Cty., 371 S.C. 224, 237,
638 S.E.2d 685, 692 (2006) (citing Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 310 S.C. at 148, 425
S.E.2d at 774).
42. See Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 423 S.C. 640, 652 n.5, 817 S.E.2d 273, 279 n.5
(2018) (quoting Las Palmas Assocs. v. Las Palmas Ctr. Assocs., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 318 (Ct.
App. 1991)).
43. 374 S.C. 588, 649 S.E.2d 135 (Ct. App. 2007).
44. Id. at 603-04, 649 S.E.2d at 143-44.
45. 289 S.C. 89, 96, 344 S.E.2d 869, 874 (Ct. App. 1986).
46. Id.
47. Pope v. Heritage Cmtys., Inc., 395 S.C. 404, 419-20, 717 S.E.2d 765, 773 (Ct. App.
2011) (upholding the trial court's finding of an amalgamation of interests on the basis of
shared locations, phone numbers, and board members); Kincaid, 289 S.C. at 96, 344 S.E.2d at
874 (affirming the trial court's finding of amalgamation where all three corporate offices were
in the same location and corporate letterhead expansively identified the marketing entity as a
"Development, Construction, Sales, and Property Management Company," suggesting a
blurring between three purportedly distinctive corporate entities: marketing, development, and
construction).
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Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in Magnolia North Property Owners'
Association, Inc. v. Heritage Communities in 2012.48
Only in Magnolia did the court of appeals address the contention that
amalgamation should be considered as a theory of relief under the doctrine
of piercing the corporate veil, thus demanding a showing of fraud or
fundamental unfairness before setting aside the corporate form. 49 The court
of appeals declined to distinguish Magnolia from previous cases of
amalgamation, upholding the rule that so long as there was blurring of
corporate entities, that sole factor was a sufficient justification for imputing
extra-corporate liability. 0 Thus, prior to Pertuis, the longstanding statutory
right to limit liability by creating separate corporate entities remained
precarious, albeit illusory, so long as any plaintiff could assert that multiple
corporate entities shared minor features and practices.
III. PERTUIS V. FRONT ROE RESTAURANTS, INC.

A.

Facts of Case

In 1998, defendants Mark and Larkin Hammond formed Lake Point
Restaurants, Inc. (Lake Point), a North Carolina S-Corporation, and
thereafter purchased a restaurant in Lake Lure, North Carolina."' The
restaurant began operating as Larkin's on the Lake.52 The Hammonds were
Lake Point's exclusive shareholders and had equal ownership interests.53 In
2000, the Hammonds employed plaintiff Kyle Pertuis as the "general
manager" of the restaurant.5 4 Pertuis's compensation agreement included a
base salary, bonuses based on profitability benchmarks, and a ten percent
ownership interest in Lake Point based on a five-year agreed upon graduated
vesting schedule to encourage long-term employment. In 2007, Pertuis
acquired the agreed-upon ten percent interest in Lake Point.5 6
In 2001, the Hammonds formed a second North Carolina S-Corporation,
Beachfront Foods, Inc. (Beachfront), in order to operate another restaurant in

48. See Magnolia N. Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Heritage Cmtys., Inc., 397 S.C. 348,
358-60, 725 S.E.2d 112, 117-18 (Ct. App. 2012).
49. See id. at 358-59, 725 S.E.2d at 117-18.
50. Id. at 359, 725 S.E.2d at 118.
51. Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 423 S.C. 640, 645, 817 S.E.2d 273, 275 (2018).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Lake Lure, North Carolina.17 As with Lake Point, the Hammonds were the
exclusive shareholders with equal ownership interests in Beachfront. 8 The
Hammonds and Pertuis agreed upon a similar compensation arrangement as
with Lake Point, including awarding a ten percent ownership interest to
Pertuis based on a five-year graduated vesting schedule.5 9 Beachfront
opened the restaurant, MaLarKie's, a combination of the names Mark
Hammond, Larkin Hammond, and Kyle Pertuis. 60 However, the restaurant,
MaLarKie's, was not successful. 6' As a result, Beachfront subsequently sold
MaLarKie's in order to open and operate a different restaurant nearby,
known today as Larkin's Carolina Grill. 62 At the time of trial, Larkin's
Carolina Grill was the least profitable of the restaurants, reporting a negative
net income in years 2008-2012.63
In 2005, the Hammonds formed Front Roe Restaurants Inc. (Front Roe),
a South Carolina S-Corporation. 64 As with Lake Point and Beachfront at
formation, the Hammonds were the sole shareholders with equal ownership
interests in Front Roe. 65 Front Roe purchased a restaurant in Greenville,
South Carolina, and subsequently opened as Larkin's on the River.66 At the
time of trial, Larkin's on the River was the most profitable of the three
restaurants.67
After the incorporation of Front Roe, Pertuis relocated to Greenville,
South Carolina. 68 However, unlike in his previous compensation agreements
regarding Lake Point and Beachfront, the parties did not arrange for a
similar graduated ten percent, five-year vesting schedule of Front Roe for
Pertuis. 69 Rather, Pertuis's opportunity to earn a ten percent ownership
interest in Front Roe was based on profitability benchmarks instead of length
of service. 70 At trial, no party was able to provide an agreed-upon written
vesting schedule.7 ' Mark Hammond testified to the nature of the vesting
agreement, indicating Pertuis was "to receive a 1% interest the year Front

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 645-46, 817 S.E.2d at 275.
Id. at 646, 817 S.E.2d at 275.
Id. at 646, 817 S.E.2d at 275-76.
Id. at 646, 817 S.E.2d at 276.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Roe first became profitable and an additional 9% once the company
achieved a net operating profit of $500,000."172 Pertuis acquired a one

percent ownership interest by 2007; however, both parties stipulated that as
of trial, Front Roe never reached the requisite $500,000 benchmark for the
remaining nine percent interest to vest.73

Between 2008 and 2009, the parties began discussing the possibility of
different compensation packages in order to grant Pertuis a ten percent
ownership interest in Front Roe. 74 However, at trial the parties disagreed as
to whether an agreement was reached.7 5 The parties ultimately parted ways,
"although it is unclear from the record whether the decision was Pertuis's,
76
the Hammonds', or a mutual one."

B. ProceduralHistory
Initial negotiations to buy out Pertuis's shares in Lake Point,
Beachfront, and Front Roe, were unsuccessful as a result of disagreement
regarding both the valuation of Pertuis's shares and Pertuis's entitlement to
business records in order to estimate the value of those shares.7 7 Defendants
sought a protective order of confidentiality before permitting Pertuis access
to corporate records on March 1, 2010.78 Subsequent to the order, Pertuis
counterclaimed, alleging he was an oppressed minority shareholder. 79
Pertuis sought relief in the form of a buyout of his shares, outstanding
shareholder distributions, and compensation for termination of his
employment.so The parties were subsequently realigned.'

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 658-59, 817 S.E.2d 273 at 282.
76. Id. at 647, 817 S.E.2d at 276.
77. Id.
78. Br. of Pet'rs at 2, Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 423 S.C. 640, 817 S.E.2d 273,
(2018) (No. 2010-CP-23-1646); Br. of Resp't at 4, Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 423 S.C.
640, 817 S.E.2d 273, (2018) (No. 2010-CP-23-1646).
79. Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., No. 2010CP2301646, 2013 WL 8482353, at *1
(Ct. Corn. Pl. S.C. July 2, 2013).
80. Id.
81. Br. of Pet'rs, supra note 78, at 2.
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Trial Court

Following a bench trial, 82 the trial court found the three corporate
entities should be amalgamated into a "de facto partnership" operating out of
Greenville, South Carolina based on a blurring of corporate identities
between corporate defendants-including movement of corporate funds
between corporations without documentation, lack of shareholder meetings,
and lack of board meetings.83 Thus, the court elected to amalgamate the
three corporations and impose liability for the "dearth of respect for proper
corporate governance."84
In evaluating Pertuis's percentage ownership, the trial court concluded
Pertuis was a ten percent shareholder in Lake Point and Beachfront. 5 With
regard to Front Roe, the court concluded that despite plaintiffs introduction
of an email exchange to suggest the parties reached an agreement to grant
Pertuis a ten percent ownership interest, the absence of any documented
vesting schedule required the court to use its equity power to "treat this
disputed ownership issue as if there was a graduated vesting schedule in
place." 86 Thus, because Front Roe's 2008 gross profit was only $361,498, or
seventy-two percent of $500,000, the court declared Pertuis held a 7.2%
ownership interest in Front Roe. 7
The trial court found Pertuis was an oppressed minority shareholder and
ordered the Hammonds to buy out Pertuis's interest in all three
corporations," relying entirely on the testimony presented by Pertuis's
expert witness valuing Lake Point at $507,000, Beachfront at $0, and Front
Roe at $1,376,000.89 The court agreed with the expert for Pertuis, whose
valuation factored in the high brand recognition value of Larkin's on the
River, despite the Hammonds' expert who testified as to the "dismal future"
of Front Roe. 90 The court highlighted that the Hammonds' expert's
testimony was altogether suspect due to his failure to address Greenville's
substantial growth, Larkin's on the River's brand value, and to conform to
generally acceptable accounting principles. 91

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Pertuis,2013 WL 8482353, at *1.
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3, *4.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *4.
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Additionally, the trial court ordered unpaid bonuses and distributions be
paid to Pertuis as a result of the Hammonds' "shaky accounting." 92 The trial
court declined to order compensation to Pertuis on the basis of the
termination of his employment. 93 In total, the trial court ordered payment to
Pertuis of $98,047 for ten percent interests in both Lake Point and
Beachfront, $198,189 for a 7.2% interest in Front Roe, and $99,117 for
unpaid distributions. 94
2.

South CarolinaCourt ofAppeals

On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decisions, emphasizing that the only argument preserved on appeal
was appellant Hammonds' motion for directed verdict at the close of
Pertuis's case. 95 Nonetheless, the court evaluated appellant defendants'
argument that the trial court erred in amalgamating the three businesses with
a locus of operation in Greenville, South Carolina. 96 The court of appeals
held that in spite of the trial court's use of the term "de facto partnership"
instead of "amalgamation" in its decision to impose liability, there was no
reversible error. 97 The court of appeals indicated the trial court's imposition
of liability for a "de facto partnership" was consistent with existing South
Carolina case law imposing liability for amalgamation.9 8
Additionally, on appeal the Hammonds argued that the trial court erred
by assigning separate values to each individual corporate entity, including a
$0 value to Beachfront. 99 Defendants argued:
Pertuis "cannot have it both ways-either [the three corporations]
are an amalgamated entity that should be evaluated as one entity
(thus pulling in the negative value of [BFI] to reduce the overall
value) in which Pertuis owns something less than 10% of the whole,
or they are indeed separate entities with separate values and
ownership interests and governed by separate state laws."' 0 0

92. Id
93. Id
94.
95.
Ct. App.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id
Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., No. 2013-002257, 2016 WL 757503, at *1 (S.C.
Feb. 24, 2016).
Id. at *1-2.
Id at *2.
Id. at *2-3.
Id at *1.

100. Id
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Specifically, both parties acknowledged that Beachfront had "negative
equity."' Pertuis's expert assigned a negative value of $410,271, while the
Hammonds' expert assigned a negative value of $620,000. 102 Nevertheless,
the court of appeals indicated that not only was the valuation issue
unpreserved on appeal, but that the Hammonds failed to cite any cases in
support of their position.1 03 Additionally, the court highlighted that the
Hammonds' expert valued the entities separately, just as Pertuis's expert
did. 104
3.

South CarolinaSupreme Court

The Hammonds appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing
that the court of appeals erred both in finding the three corporations operated
as a single-business enterprise in Greenville, South Carolina and in finding
this argument unpreserved on appeal. 05 Additionally, the Hammonds
argued the court erred in awarding Pertuis a 7.2% ownership interest in
Front Roe, in ordering payment of $99,117 in unpaid shareholder
distributions, in not assigning Beachfront a negative value in determining
corporation valuation, and in finding Pertuis was an oppressed minority
shareholder.1

06

C. Holding
The South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a new two-part test for
establishing amalgamation,1 07 indicating preference for the term "single
business enterprise theory" instead of amalgamation.10 The supreme court
emphasized that the court of appeals erred in determining the issue of
amalgamation was not preserved for appellate review and that:
[I]t was an abuse of discretion for the court of appeals to raise this
issue sua sponte then to deny Petitioners' request to supplement the
record with materials in response to the court of appeals' questions

101. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 78, at 45.
102. Id.
103. Pertuis,2016 WL 757503, at *2.
104. Id The court did note that the issue of proper valuation of individual entities was
preserved on appeal but ultimately deferred to the trial court's evaluation that investments in
BFI were debt, not equity, despite strong evidence suggesting otherwise. Id. at *4.
105. Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 423 S.C. 640, 648, 817 S.E.2d 273, 277 (2018).
106. Id
107. Id. at 655, 817 S.E.2d at 280-81.
108. See id. at 653-54, 817 S.E.2d at 279-80.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 5
904

[VOL. 70: 891

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

at oral argument, particularly where counsel for Pertuis conceded
the Hammonds' challenge was preserved.1 09
As a result, the court vacated the court of appeals' decision as to the
imposition of liability on the basis of single-business enterprise theory, first
by indicating the trial court's use of the term "de facto partnership" was
misleading, as the trial court was conceptually referring to single-business
enterprise theory.110 Second, the court held that there was insufficient
evidence to establish the three corporations operated as a single enterprise
operating out of Greenville, South Carolina and therefore, the corporations
must be considered individually."I Thus, citing the internal affairs doctrine,
the court vacated the court of appeals' decisions as to the two North Carolina
corporations, Lake Point and Beachfront." 2
Additionally, the court vacated the trial court's decision as to the proper
valuation of Pertuis's ownership interest in Front Roe." 3 Lastly, the
supreme court modified the amount of unpaid shareholder distributions
ordered to be paid to Pertuis. 114
IV.

ANALYSIS

OF

THE

COURT'S

ADOPTION

OF

SINGLE-BUSINESS

ENTERPRISE THEORY

A.

Derivation ofSingle-Business Enterprise Theory Liability

The South Carolina Supreme Court cited the Texas Supreme Court case,
SSP Partners v. GladstrongInvestments (USA) Corp., as the basis of South
Carolina's new test for establishing single-business enterprise theory. "' In
SSP Partners,the plaintiff brought a products liability action against both a
foreign manufacturer-producer and a United States distribution entity.1 16 In
evaluating whether to set aside the corporate form, the court emphasized that
existing Texas case law permitted disregard of the corporate form in cases
where "corporations . . . engage in any sharing of names, offices,
accounting, employees, services, and finances"; it further noted, however,

109. Id. at 648 n.3, 817 S.E.2d at 277 n.3.
110. Id. at 656, 817 S.E.2d at 281.
111. See id. at 656-57, 817 S.E.2d at 281.
112. Id. at 657, 817 S.E.2d at 282.
113. Id. at 660, 817 S.E.2d at 283.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 655, 817 S.E.2d at 280 (citing SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp.,
275 S.W.3d 444, 455 (Tex. 2008)).
116. SSPPartners,275 S.W.3d at 447.
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that "[t]here is nothing abusive or unjust about any of these practices in the
abstract." 117
The SSP Partners court strongly criticized previous decisions setting
aside the corporate form exclusively on the basis of a blurring feature
between entities, stating that "while other courts have applied the theory,
none to our knowledge has found sound jurisprudential footing for the
theory.""I The court expressed skepticism as to the legitimacy and necessity
of single-business enterprise liability as an additional theory of relief for
imposing corporate liability.11 9
Nonetheless, the Texas Supreme Court elected to adopt a middle ground
approach to establishing single-business enterprise liability, strengthening
corporate protections from extra-corporate liability by requiring equitable
justification, yet acknowledging the presence of single-business enterprise
liability as a viable theory of relief.1 20 The court held that:
Creation of affiliated corporations to limit liability while pursuing
common goals lies firmly within the law and is commonplace. We
have never held corporations liable for each other's obligations
merely because of centralized control, mutual purposes, and shared
finances. There must also be evidence of abuse,... or injustice and
inequity. By "injustice" and "inequity" we do not mean a subjective
perception of unfairness by an individual judge or juror; rather,
these words are used . .. as shorthand references for the kinds of
abuse, specifically identified, that the corporate structure should not
shield fraud, evasion of existing obligations, circumvention of
statutes, monopolization, criminal conduct, and the like. Such abuse
is necessary before disregarding the existence of a corporation as a
separate entity. Any other rule would seriously compromise what
we have called a "bedrock principle of corporate law"-that a
legitimate purpose for forming a corporation is to limit individual
liability for the corporation's obligations.
Disregarding
the
corporate
structure
involves
two
considerations. One is the relationship between two entities.... The
other consideration is whether the entities' use of limited liability
was illegitimate.

117.
118.
119.
2003).
120.

. .

. [The second consideration] must be based on a

Id. at 454.
Id.
See id. at 452; see also S. Union Co. v. City of Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d 74, 87 (Tex.
See SSP Partners,275 S.W.3d at 454-55.
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careful evaluation of the policies supporting the principle of limited
liability. 121
Thus, the court emphasized that imposing liability across separate
corporate entities is only permitted where there is substantial equitable
justification for disregarding the corporate rights afforded to limited liability
entities. 122
B. EvaluatingSingle-Business EnterpriseLiability in Pertuis
In Pertuis, after expressly adopting the Texas Supreme Court's test from
SSP Partners for single-business enterprise theory liability, the court
reiterated that "single business enterprise theory requires a showing of more
than the various entities' operations are intertwined."1 23 Rather, "combining
multiple corporate entities into a single business enterprise requires further
evidence of bad faith, abuse, fraud, wrongdoing, or injustice resulting from
the blurring of the entities' legal distinctions."1 24 Thus, similar to the Texas
Supreme Court in SSP Partners,the South Carolina Supreme Court declined
to follow existing case law that permitted disregard of the corporate form
solely on the basis of a blurring of corporate activities. 25 instead, the court
indicated that justice demands the party seeking to set aside the corporate
form in single-business enterprise liability to establish manifest fraud,
injustice, or sufficient equitable reason to impose liability, as disregard for
the corporate form revokes substantial and statutorily-conveyed corporate
rights. 126
In evaluating whether the three corporations in Pertuis were intertwined,
the court highlighted that although the defendants failed to strictly comply
with corporate formalities, such disregard for corporate formalities was
expressly authorized by statute.1 27 The court stated that, "the trial court's
analysis not only failed to assign the burden of proof to Pertuis, as the party
seeking amalgamation, but also overlooked the corporations' status as SCorporations, which are statutorily permitted to disregard the very corporate
formalities identified by the trial court as lacking."1 28 However, the court

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 455 (citation omitted).
Id. at 451 (quoting Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. 1986)).
Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 423 S.C. 640, 655, 817 S.E.2d 273, 280 (2018).
Id. at 655, 817 S.E.2d at 281.
See id. at 655, 817 S.E.2d at 280-81.
See id.
Id. at 657, 817 S.E.2d at 281.
Id. at 656-57, 817 S.E.2d at 281.
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then mistakenly cited to South Carolina's Statutory Close Corporation
Supplement. 2 9 As an S-Corporation classification sounds in a tax
distinction, not in a corporate statutory provision, it appears reasonably clear
the court was mistaken in its use of the term S-Corporation instead of close
corporation. However, in mentioning S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-18-200 to 230,
the court failed to identify what corresponding North Carolina law would
statutorily permit either Lake Point or Beachfront to disregard corporate

formalities.

130

The court suggested that in evaluating a claim of single-business
enterprise liability, a court need not reach the second consideration of
equitable justification if there is insufficient evidence to show an
intertwining of corporate operations.13' Thus, in evaluating Pertuis, the
supreme court may not have even needed to consider the second equitable
factor of the test in light of testimony that while the three corporations did
share corporate officers and directors, the corporations did not share
employees, bank accounts, loan obligations, or contracts with third

parties. 132
Nonetheless, the court elected to evaluate the second factor in light of a
few facts that may have suggested a corporate-blurring, including movement
of corporate funds without documentation and the conveyance of property
without corporate formality. 133 The court emphasized that in considering the
second factor, there was altogether no evidence of bad faith to support the
trial court's imposition of single-business enterprise liability across the three
separate corporate entities. 134
However, the court did not clearly address whether plaintiffs evidence
"that he was excluded from a real estate opportunity in connection with
[Lake Point]" and that defendants "opened a new restaurant, 'Grill Marks,'
using funds from [Front Roe], without offering to allow plaintiff to
participate in the new venture" was considered or would satisfy the bad
faith requirement under single-business enterprise theory. 13
Additionally, Pertuis provided little guidance as to how the doctrine of
single-business enterprise liability may intersect with the internal affairs

129. Id. at 657 n.8, 817 S.E.2d at 281 n.8.
130. See id. at 657, 817 S.E.2d at 282.
131. See id. at 655, 817 S.E.2d at 281 (quoting Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co., 380
S.C. 97, 101, 668 S.E.2d 798, 800 (2008)).
132. Br. of Pet'rs, supra note 78, at 34.
133. Pertuis,423 S.C. at 656, 817 S.E.2d at 281.
134. Id. at 657, 817 S.E.2d at 281.
135. Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., No. 2010CP2301646, 2013 WL 8482353, at *3
(Ct. Corn. Pl. S.C. July 2, 2013).
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doctrine should a foreign corporation be subject to single-business enterprise
liability.136 However, it appears quite conceivable that "[p]iercing the veil
cases may not be governed by the internal affairs rule even if that rule is
applied to foreig[n] corporations," as such disputes are not between
shareholders and managers, but rather those linked to corporate interests by
tort or contract.1
V.

37

IMPACT OFPERTUIS

A.

DecisionsSince Pertuis

The South Carolina Court of Appeals recently applied the new rule for
establishing single-business enterprise liability in two cases, Walbeck v. I'On
Co., LLC.,1 38 and Stoneledge at Lake Keowee Owners' Association, Inc. v.
IMK Development Co., LLC.1 39
In Walbeck, the plaintiff asserted a claim of amalgamation against the
defendant developer where the developer promised "to convey certain
amenities in a residential community to a homeowner's [sic] association." 14 0
The court emphasized the difference between actions to set aside corporate
form in order to hold corporation's principals personally liable for corporate
wrongdoing and the concept of single-business enterprise liability.' 4 ' The
court underscored that the test derived from Sturkie remains in effect for
actions seeking to impose personal liability for corporate wrongdoing,
requiring a showing of both, "(1) the failure to observe corporate formalities
and (2) 'an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness if the'
corporation's acts are 'not regarded as the acts of its principals."1 42
However, the court clarified that a party seeking to combine corporate
entities into a single-business enterprise for the purposes of imposing
liability need not show the failure to observe corporate formalities, but that
(1) the entities' operations are intertwined or blurred and (2) "an element of

136. See Pertuis, 423 S.C. at 657, 817 S.E.2d at 282.
137. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1053-54 (1991).
138. No. 2015-001590, 2019 WL 1065928 (S.C. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2018).
139. 425 S.C. 276, 821 S.E.2d 509 (Ct. App. 2018).
140. Walbeck, 2019 WL 1065928, at *1.
141. Id. at *15.
142. Id. (quoting Mid-S. Mgt. Co. v. Sherwood Dev. Corp., 374 S.C. 588, 597-98, 649
S.E.2d 135, 140-41 (Ct. App. 2007)); see generally Hunting v. Elders, 359 S.C. 217, 225-26,
597 S.E.2d 803, 807 (Ct. App. 2004) (indicating failure to observe corporate formalities is
statutorily permitted, yet does not preclude an action to pierce the corporate veil in light of
other factors supporting setting aside the corporate form).
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injustice or fundamental unfairness, to place accountability where it
belongs."' 43 Thus, while both theories require a similar showing of equitable
justification, the court emphasized that Pertuis pertains to actions imposing
liability across corporations, not merely actions seeking to impose personal
liability for corporate wrongdoing.1 44
The court declined to impose liability, stating "even though there is
evidence showing the various entities' operations are intertwined, there is no
evidence of 'bad faith, abuse, fraud, wrongdoing,
or injustice resulting from
45
the blurring of the entities' legal distinctions."1
In Stoneledge, the court of appeals elected to impose single-business
enterprise liability in a construction defect action by a homeowners'
association plaintiff against a developer corporation and a builder
corporation.1 46 The court held that while the trial court made a finding of
amalgamation of interests prior to the supreme court's decision in Pertuis,
the record contained sufficient evidence upon which to base its decision to
impose single-business enterprise liability because "of a unified operation
between ... the amalgamated parties as well as evidence of self-dealing that
resulted from a blending of their business enterprises."1 47 Specifically, the
court emphasized that funds passed directly between entities and members
operated as "dual agents without distinction as to who they represented."1 48
Furthermore, parties shared profits, offices, and email addresses.1 49 The
court appeared to rely on these factors to satisfy the first element of the test
for single-business enterprise theory liability. 10

143. See Walbeck, 2019 WL 1065928, at *16.
144. See id. at *15.
145. Id. at *16 (quoting Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 423 S.C. 640, 655, 817 S.E.2d
273, 281 (2018)). However, the court's initial opinion elected to impose liability on the basis
of a blurring of corporate entities. See Walbeck v. The I'On Co., LLC., App. Case No. 2015001590, 2018 WL 3748668 (Aug. 8, 2018). The court cited evidence of defendants' "common
employees, principals, and activities as well as the confusion displayed by those who deal with
[defendants] as to which entity they were dealing with." Id. at *18. Additionally, there was
evidence the entities were referred to interchangeably. Id. at *19. In turning to the second
prong of single-business enterprise liability, the court held that in light of defendants' control
of property promised to the homeowners' association and defendants' coordinated profit at the
expense of the homeowners' association, it would be "fundamentally unfair to assign liability
to any one or more of these entities to the exclusion of others." Id.
146. Stoneledge at Lake Keowee Owners' Ass'n, v. IMK Dev. Co., 425 S.C. 276, 28586, 821 S.E.2d 509, 514 (Ct. App. 2018).
147. Id. at 298, 821 S.E.2d at 520.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 298-99, 821 S.E.2d at 520-21.
150. See id. at 298, 821 S.E.2d at 520.
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"

However, it appears unclear from the court's analysis precisely what
evidence was relied upon to find the Pertuis test's second element satisfied,
other than an indication of finding self-dealing.'"' Specifically the court
cited "constructive knowledge of the pervasive construction defects that
plagued the project,"152 including water damage and rot to various
structures.' 53 The court found that because corporate success was dependent
on selling units, including those constructively known by one individual to
have damage, sufficient equitable justification existed for imposing singlebusiness enterprise theory. 154 Thus, the court established that constructive
knowledge in this case established the requisite bad faith, abuse, fraud,
wrongdoing or injustice necessary to satisfy single-business enterprise
liability.
B. Strengtheningthe Veil
The court's adoption of the single-business enterprise theory in Pertuis
realigns the former doctrine of amalgamation, now called single-business
enterprise theory, with other recognized doctrines for imposing extracorporate liability. Prior to Pertuis, the South Carolina Supreme Court had
not recognized the doctrine of amalgamation as a justification for setting
aside the corporate form.' 56
However, lower courts had long been willing to set aside the corporate
barriers between sibling entities solely on the basis of a blurring or
intertwining of corporate identities. 5 7 Thus, among lower courts, there
existed significant disparity between doctrines permitting the disregard of
the corporate form.' 8 While traditional piercing doctrine and alter ego
doctrine required a substantial showing of equitable justification,
amalgamation required no equitable justification whatsoever. 5 9 As a result,
in the eyes of corporate entities, limited liability was but an illusive right in
the context of sibling entities. 160
In effect, Pertuis restores the corporate veil to the extent that a
corporation now retains the statutory right to remain a distinctive entity

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id. at 299-300, 821 S.E.2d at 521.
Id.
Id. at 285, 821 S.E.2d at 513.
Id. at 299-300, 821 S.E.2d at 521.
See id.
See id. at 297-98, 821 S.E.2d at 520.
See McWilliams, supra note 23, at 840.
See id. at 833.
See id. at 844.
See id. at 843-44.
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unless substantial equitable justification exists for setting aside the corporate
form, including in the context of actions to impose single-business enterprise
liability.' 6 ' By strengthening corporate protections that were previously
more permeable under the former doctrine of amalgamation, Pertuisrestores
statutory corporate rights, including the limitation of liability, which may in
the long-term serve to incentivize capital formation. Additionally, Pertuis
eliminates the ability of plaintiffs to unwarrantedly aggregate corporate
entities in the hopes of higher recovery without any showing of equitable
justification. 162
Pertuis's greatest impact is likely to be felt by close corporations
exclusively, as publicly held corporations are rarely the subjects of actions to
set aside the corporate form.1 63 In an empirical study reviewing data of
1,583 cases asserting an action to pierce the corporate veil, piercing did not
occur at all in a publicly held corporation, likely because:
This universal respect for the separateness of the corporate entity in
publicly held corporations reflects the different role that limited
liability plays in larger corporations. All corporations can use the
corporate form to allocate risk. Limited liability performs the
additional function in larger corporations of facilitating the
transferability of shares and making possible organized securities
markets with the increased liquidity and diversification benefits that
these markets make possible. The absence of these market-related
benefits for close corporations explains, in part, why courts are
more willing to pierce the veil of close corporations, but a piercing
result still requires a combination of other factors. The total absence
of piercing in public corporations permits a stronger positive
statement for those corporations: the market-related benefits of
limited liability are sufficient to prevail over all possible claims of
those who have claims against the public corporation and cannot
collect from its assets. 164
Additionally, there appears reasonable correlation to suggest that the
fewer corporate shareholders there are in a corporation the more likely a
court is to impose liability in piercing actions.1 65 Thus, small closely held

161.
162.
(2018).
163.
164.
165.

See id. at 844.
See Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 423 S.C. 640, 657, 817 S.E.2d 273, 281-82
See Thompson, supra note 137, at 1047-48.
Id.
Id. at 1054-55.
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corporations may, upon initial review, benefit from the heightened singlebusiness enterprise theory standard.
It is unclear if the doctrine of single-business enterprise liability would
conclusively extend to a limited liability company. The South Carolina
Supreme Court acknowledged that it has not yet recognized the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil in the context of an LLC.' 66 However, because of
the sheer prevalence of the limited liability form in corporate practice and its
similar rights compared to corporations, 6 7 a court would likely permit the
imposition of single-business enterprise liability only upon the same
showing of equitable justification as delineated in Pertuis.168 Interestingly,
in one case citing Pertuis, Stoneledge, the South Carolina Court of Appeals
elected to impose single-business enterprise liability against a defendant
LLC.1 69 Additionally, the supreme

court has suggested in dicta that

assuming the doctrine applies, the court would be willing to impose extracorporate liability should a case arise where the facts present sufficient
equitable justification. 170
C. DoctrinalExpansion and Legislative Intent
1.

PrevalenceofSingle-Business Enterprise Theory

The South Carolina Supreme Court in Pertuis recognized that at least
fourteen states around the country already recognize single-business
enterprise theory in addition to traditional piercing doctrine.17 ' However,
prior to Pertuis the vast majority of South Carolina actions asserting claims

166. Oskin v. Johnson, 400 S.C. 390, 408 n.17, 735 S.E.2d 459, 469 n.17 (2012).
167. S.C. CODE ANN. § 3-44-201 (2006) (stating "a limited liability company is a legal
entity distinct from its members"); see id. § 33-44-303(a)-(b) (indicating except as otherwise
provided in the articles of organization, "a member or manager is not personally liable for a
debt, obligation, or liability of the company solely by reason of being or acting as a member or
manager," and the failure to observe corporate formalities is not a ground for imposing
personal liability).
168. See Shawn Flanagan, Piercing the Corporate Veil in South Carolina, S.C. LAW.,
Nov. 2006, at 35, 41.
169. Stoneledge at Lake Keowee Owners' Ass'n, v. IMK Dev. Co., 425 S.C. 276, 300,
821 S.E.2d 509, 521 (Ct. App. 2018).
170. Oskin, 400 S.C. at 408 n. 17, 735 S.E.2d at 469 n. 17.
171. Pertuis v. Front Roe Rests., Inc., 423 S.C. 640, 654, 817 S.E.2d 273, 280 (2018); see
also Stephen B. Presser, The BogalusaExplosion, "Single Business Enterprise," "Alter Ego,"
and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited Liability:
Back Towards a Unitary "Abuse" Theory ofPiercingthe Corporate Veil, 100 Nw. U. L. REV.
405, 422-23 (2006) (comparing and contrasting various jurisdictions' common law
interpretations and implementations of single-business enterprise theory).
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of amalgamation involved a blending of operations in construction defect
cases.1 72 Thus, Pertuis presents an example of the slow expansion of the
doctrine of amalgamation into other areas of the law beyond merely
construction defect.1 73 This expansion also includes the seminal case of SSP
Partners,a Texas products liability action, the precise case from which the
South Carolina Supreme Court derived the new test for single-business
enterprise liability.1 74 This slow broadening of cases asserting amalgamation
and single-business enterprise theory may suggest that this theory of relief
provides a new arrow in the quiver of all corporate claimants.
Within merely four months of the Pertuis decision, the South Carolina
Court of Appeals heard arguments asserting single-business enterprise
liability in two cases. 17 Additionally, single-business enterprise theory has
survived defendants' motion for summary judgment in a pending products
liability action by plaintiffs against a defendant corporation and a defendant
limited liability company.1 76 Notably, courts more frequently impose
liability in a sibling corporation context than in a parent subsidiary
context. 17 Because single-business enterprise theory is statistically favored
as a means of piercing the corporate veil compared to other methods of
setting aside the corporate form, the stricter rule may still not deter
claims. 178
While Pertuis strengthens corporate protections, the court's recognition
of a third doctrine of equitable relief beyond traditional vertical piercing and
alter ego theory may signal the common law doctrine of setting aside the
corporate form will continue to expand and find new ways to erode broad
statutory rights bestowed upon corporate entities by the General Assembly.

172. See, e.g., Drury Dev. Corp. v. Found. Ins. Co., 380 S.C. 97, 100-01, 668 S.E.2d
798, 799-800 (2008); Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co., 299 S.C. 335, 337-38, 384
S.E.2d 730, 732-33 (1989); Magnolia N. Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Heritage Cmtys., Inc., 397
S.C. 348, 356-57, 725 S.E.2d 112, 116-17 (Ct. App. 2012); Pope v. Heritage Cmtys., Inc., 395
S.C. 404, 410-11, 717 S.E.2d 765, 768-69 (Ct. App. 2011); Mid-S. Mgt. Co. v. Sherwood
Dev. Corp., 374 S.C. 588, 592-95, 649 S.E.2d 135, 137-39 (Ct. App. 2007); Kincaid v.
Landing Dev. Corp., 289 S.C. 89, 91-92, 344 S.E.2d 869, 871-72 (Ct. App. 1986).
173. See Pertuis,423 S.C. at 644, 817 S.E.2d at 275 (an action to impose single-business
enterprise liability against restaurant entities).
174. See SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 446-47 (Tex.
2008).
175. See Walbeck v. I'On Co., No. 2015-001590, 2019 WL 1065928, at *15 (S.C. Ct.
App. Aug. 8, 2018); Stoneledge at Lake Keowee Owners' Ass'n v. IMK Dev. Co., 425 S.C.
276, 300, 821 S.E.2d 509, 521 (Ct. App. 2018).
176. See Hulsizer v. Magline, Inc., No. 4:17-cv-00415-RBH, 2018 WL 5617873, at *9
n.16 (D.S.C. Oct. 29, 2018).
177. See Thompson, supra note 137, at 1055, 1056-57.
178. See id.
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The Necessity ofSingle-Business EnterpriseLiability

Despite the increased prevalence of the doctrine of single-business
enterprise theory, some have gone so far as to suggest that single-business
enterprise theory is not only "similar" to alter ego,1 79 but perhaps need not
even be permitted as another distinctive theory of relief.s0 In application:
Just as in alter ego, the purpose of the single business enterprise
theory is to allow the claimant to recover from another party when a
corporation has insufficient assets. The effect of the two theories is
also exactly the same. Both theories disregard a corporation's
separate legal existence and hold one entity liable for another
entity's debts or obligations. 18
Because alter ego liability permits the imposition of liability in the
presence of corporate control of another corporation so as to render no
distinctive interests between entities, single-business enterprise theory may
merely serve as old wine in a new bottle.' 82
Additionally, there are other methods of ensuring plaintiffs have greater
protections against inadequate compensation than expanding piercing
doctrine, "including mandatory capitalization laws, insurance requirements,
product safety requirements, priority treatment in corporate bankruptcy
cases, and employing 'gatekeeper' liability." 83 Thus, expanding the piercing
doctrine may serve only to perpetuate the chaotic nature of the remedy.1 84
Contrastingly, an alternative view suggests the expansive use of
corporate form among and between corporate entities may deviate
substantially from the original intent of the creators of limited liability
doctrine, namely of encouraging economic investment in single entities with
numerous, unsophisticated, and individual shareholders.' Thus, in the
context of cases where multiple corporate entities serve as shareholders:

179. Marilyn Montano, Note, The Single Business Enterprise Theory in Texas: A
Singularly Bad Idea?, 55 BAYLOR L. REv. 1163, 1177-78 (2003).
180. See SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 452 (Tex.
2008) (quoting S. Union Co. v. City of Edinburg, 129 S.W.3d 74, 87 (Tex. 2003)).
181. See Montano, supra note 179, at 1190.
182. Id. at 1189-90.
183. Presser, supra note 171, at 410-11 (citing Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future
of UnlimitedLiability: A CapitalMarkets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 419-23 (1992)).
184. Id. at 411.
185. See John H. Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An Empirical Study
of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent-SubsidiaryContext, 87 N.C. L. REv. 1091, 1101
(2009).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss4/5

24

Patterson: Pertuis v. Front Roe Restaurants, Inc.: Equity Restores the Corpo
2019]

SINGLE-BUSINESS ENTERPRISE THEORY

915

In such a situation [where] there are no passive investors to be
protected, there usually is no separation of ownership and control,
there is no need to encourage widespread distribution of shares and
there are no information and monitoring costs. Parent corporations
are able to diversify their portfolio and spread the risks themselves;
in addition, financial institutions as investors, contrary to individual
investors, have the same ability to diversify. Also the argument
relating to the efficiency of the capital markets is less relevant when
all of the subsidiary's shares are owned by the parent. Finally, the
enforcement costs of creditors are less in corporate groups since
creditors can proceed directly against the parent instead of
numerous stockholders. As a result, both from the historical and
from the economic perspective, limited liability and corporate
groups would not constitute a good marriage.' 86
Despite the presence of academic and economic analysis criticizing
limited liability application to corporate shareholders, legislative intent
appears firmly rooted to the doctrine of broad limited liability in a variety of
corporate structures so long as use of the corporate form does not offend or
abuse public policy.
Thus, as suggested by the Texas court in SSP Partners,single-business
enterprise theory may present a middle ground between absolutely no
recognition of a theory of relief where corporate entities are so intertwined
and in furtherance of a fraudulent or abusive purpose and the imposition of
limitless liability in the context of increasingly corporate structured entities
with no individual investors.1 7
VI. CONCLUSION

The South Carolina Supreme Court's adoption of the two-part test for
establishing single-business enterprise theory of liability in Pertuis restores
foundational corporate rights conferred by the General Assembly in South
Carolina Code § 33-6-220(b). 8 8 By expressly requiring equitable
justification, single-business enterprise liability now closely parallels other
equitable doctrines for setting aside the corporate form, specifically
traditional vertical piercing and alter ego theories of liability. However, the

186. Id. at 1102-03 (quoting KAREN VANDEKERCKHOVE, PIERCING THE CORPORATE
VEIL 9 (2007)).

187. See SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444, 454-55 (Tex.
2008).
188. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-6-220(b) (2006).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 5
916

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

70: 891

sheer prevalence of cases citing the doctrine of single-business enterprise
liability since the court's decision in Pertuis-andthe steady expansion of
the doctrine to areas of the law beyond construction defect cases-suggest
that the new test for single-business enterprise liability may not substantially
deter litigants seeking to horizontally pierce sibling entities in search of
more sources of compensation.
The relief sought albeit more elusive now due to the required showing
of substantial equitable justification-still presents a compelling target for
plaintiffs, affording them the opportunity to reach more corporate pockets.
Nevertheless, while the use of increasingly sophisticated structures that
utilize a layered approach to limiting liability by dividing or nesting entities
appears reasonably certain to continue, in the presence of a compelling
equitable justification, courts still appear willing to set aside the corporate
form. Thus, while corporate entities may have won a small battle in the case
for strengthening corporate statutory protections in the absence of equitable
justification, the war between those against unbounded liability and those
in support of broad corporate rights promoting limited liability will
undoubtedly endure.
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